I do get impatient with the notion that my stance on one cliche'd political item has predictive value regarding my other stances.
So I am in favor of capital punishment. What is my position on marijuana?
I favor parental notification before a teenager gets an abortion. What is my position on sugar subsidies to small corn and beet farmers?
I am against the telecom tax designated to "wire the classroom to the internet". What is my position on taxing home heating oil?
I favor expanding state and federal parks and nature preserve acreage. What is my opinion on withdrawing the military from Germany, UK, and Benelux nations?
I note with some interest that in "open field" elections with multiple candidates from many factions, the "moderate" candidate like Schwarznegger or Zell Miller can acheive an absolute majority, while in two-party elections it seems the winner, between two extreme partisens, is luck to get a pluralilty.
Seems the scale is unhelpful to the process. Yah. The Almanac of American Politics charts congresscritters along three axes (economic/social/international or some such), which I think gives a clearer picture. It's not perfect, but any system is going to involve a loss of information. The trick is to lose less-important information.
I note with some interest that in "open field" elections with multiple candidates from many factions, the "moderate" candidate like Schwarznegger or Zell Miller can acheive an absolute majority, while in two-party elections it seems the winner, between two extreme partisens, is luck to get a pluralilty.
That can happen, yes, but on the other hand, in, say, a three-person race, a "moderate" who would defeat either of the flanking candidates one-on-one may have so much support gnawed off on each side as to wind up last. (I've seen a careful analysis of a race for House Majority Leader in the early '80s in which exactly this happened.) Plurality voting with a runoff if no one achieves 50% is especially susceptible to this; straight plurality voting, sans runoff, is slightly (but only slightly) less so.
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timeasmymeasure
Bent
Date: 2004-06-09 01:32 pm (UTC)So I am in favor of capital punishment. What is my position on marijuana?
I favor parental notification before a teenager gets an abortion. What is my position on sugar subsidies to small corn and beet farmers?
I am against the telecom tax designated to "wire the classroom to the internet". What is my position on taxing home heating oil?
I favor expanding state and federal parks and nature preserve acreage. What is my opinion on withdrawing the military from Germany, UK, and Benelux nations?
I note with some interest that in "open field" elections with multiple candidates from many factions, the "moderate" candidate like Schwarznegger or Zell Miller can acheive an absolute majority, while in two-party elections it seems the winner, between two extreme partisens, is luck to get a pluralilty.
Seems the scale is unhelpful to the process.
Re: Bent
Date: 2004-06-09 01:49 pm (UTC)Yah. The Almanac of American Politics charts congresscritters along three axes (economic/social/international or some such), which I think gives a clearer picture. It's not perfect, but any system is going to involve a loss of information. The trick is to lose less-important information.
I note with some interest that in "open field" elections with multiple candidates from many factions, the "moderate" candidate like Schwarznegger or Zell Miller can acheive an absolute majority, while in two-party elections it seems the winner, between two extreme partisens, is luck to get a pluralilty.
That can happen, yes, but on the other hand, in, say, a three-person race, a "moderate" who would defeat either of the flanking candidates one-on-one may have so much support gnawed off on each side as to wind up last. (I've seen a careful analysis of a race for House Majority Leader in the early '80s in which exactly this happened.) Plurality voting with a runoff if no one achieves 50% is especially susceptible to this; straight plurality voting, sans runoff, is slightly (but only slightly) less so.